THE DEFINITION OF “INDUSTRY” from Bangalore Water Supply to the 2026 Nine-Judge Judgment

Dr. Linto K B
Advocate On Record, Supreme Court of India

Abstract

The definition of the term “industry” has remained one of the most contentious and judicially laboured concepts in Indian industrial jurisprudence for over seven decades. It determines the very threshold of applicability of industrial dispute resolution mechanisms and the protective framework of labour legislation. This article undertakes a comprehensive examination of the trajectory of this definition from the expansive judicial interpretation culminating in the landmark seven-Judge decision in Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa (1978), through subsequent legislative attempts and judicial oscillations, to the current statutory formulation under Section 2(p) of the Industrial Relations Code, 2020, and the authoritative pronouncement of a nine-Judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court on 20 August 2026. The article analyses the majority and minority opinions in the 2026 judgment, the continued relevance of the Triple Test for legacy matters under the repealed Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and the independent interpretative approach mandated for the new Code. It concludes with observations on the practical implications for governmental welfare schemes, charitable institutions, educational bodies, and other organised activities.

I. Introduction
The question of what constitutes an “industry” under Indian labour law has been aptly described by the Supreme Court itself as a “proverbial albatross fastened to the Court’s metaphorical neck.” For more than seven decades, this definitional conundrum has occupied a central and recurring place in the Court’s docket, generating successive waves of litigation, conflicting judicial pronouncements, and repeated calls for legislative clarification. The term is not merely a matter of semantic interest; it operates as the very gateway to the specialised regime of industrial adjudication. Whether a particular activity, establishment, or governmental department falls within the statutory fold of “industry” determines, in tangible and often decisive terms, which entities are subject to the jurisdiction of labour courts and industrial tribunals, which workers may legitimately invoke the protective machinery of the law, and which disputes are channelled into the ordinary civil courts with their attendant delays, formalities, and limitations.
The stakes involved are considerable. Inclusion within the definition brings with it access to a specialised adjudicatory framework designed for the speedy and effective resolution of industrial disputes, statutory rights against unfair labour practices, protections in matters of retrenchment, closure, and transfer of undertakings, and the collective bargaining architecture contemplated by the legislation. Exclusion, by contrast, relegates the affected workmen to the slower and more formal processes of the ordinary civil courts, often depriving them of the beneficial and purposive interpretation that industrial jurisprudence has traditionally accorded to labour statutes. In this sense, the definitional question has never been purely technical; it has always carried significant social and economic consequences for both capital and labour.

The interpretive journey of the term has been marked by oscillation between expansive and restrictive approaches. Early decisions of the Court sought to cast the net wide, bringing municipal bodies, hospitals, research associations, and a range of governmental activities within the fold. A subsequent restrictive phase sought to confine the concept more closely to activities analogous to trade or business in a commercial sense. The Seven-Judge Bench decision in Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa in 1978 sought to resolve these conflicting currents by propounding the celebrated Triple Test, thereby inaugurating an expansive era that lasted nearly half a century. That decision, while authoritative, never fully quieted the debate. Legislative attempts at clarification remained incomplete, judicial discord over the scope of sovereign functions and welfare activities persisted, and repeated references for reconsideration kept the controversy alive.

As of August 2026, the legal landscape has undergone a fundamental transformation. The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 has been repealed and replaced by the Industrial Relations Code, 2020 which came into force on 21 November 2025. Concurrently, a nine-Judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court has delivered a landmark judgment examining the correctness of the expansive Triple Test laid down in Bangalore Water Supply, the maintainability of the long-pending reference, the treatment of governmental welfare schemes such as Social Forestry, and the relationship between the old and the new statutory regimes. The Court has carefully calibrated its response: preserving the original Triple Test for pending matters under the repealed ID Act, offering a refined formulation as its considered opinion on the proper interpretation of the erstwhile provision, and expressly freeing the interpretation of the IR Code from the shadow of the 1978 precedent.

2. Statutory Definition under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
Section 2(j) of the ID Act defined “industry” in the following terms:

“industry” means any business, trade, undertaking, manufacture or calling of employers and includes any calling, service, employment, handicraft, or industrial occupation or avocation of workmen.”

The definition is bifurcated. The first limb proceeds from the standpoint of the employer and extends to “any business, trade, undertaking, manufacture or calling of employers.” The second limb is from the perspective of the workman and encompasses “any calling, service, employment, handicraft, or industrial occupation or avocation of workmen.” The phraseology is of the widest amplitude, drawn in substantial measure from Section 4 of the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act of Australia. This width invited sustained judicial engagement and produced a rich, if at times conflicting, body of case law.

3. Pre-Bangalore Water Supply Jurisprudence
One of the earliest and most influential decisions was D.N. Banerji v. P.R. Mukherjee, wherein a Five-Judge Bench held that a municipal body could fall within the ambit of “industry.” The Court articulated what came to be known as the “analogous to trade or business” test, observing that it is sufficient if the activity bears a functional resemblance to the carrying on of trade or business and is carried on through cooperation between employers and employees. Profit motive and private ownership were held non-essential. The expression “undertaking” was construed expansively and was not to be restricted by the principle of ejusdem generis.

This expansive approach was further refined in State of Bombay v. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha, where a government-run hospital was held to be an industry. The Court formulated a structured test: the activity must be systematically or habitually undertaken; directed towards production or distribution of goods or rendering of material services; carried on with the assistance of employees; organised in a manner analogous to trade or business; and not casual or for personal consumption. Capital investment and profit motive were again declared non-essential.

Corporation of the City of Nagpur v. Its Employees introduced two important qualifications: a narrow sovereign functions exception confined to the primary and inalienable functions of a constitutional government (legislative, administrative of law, and judicial), and the predominant function test for composite departments. Ahmedabad Textile Industry’s Research Association extended the concept to a research association set up by textile mills.

A restrictive turn began with National Union of Commercial Employees v. M.R. Meher, holding a firm of solicitors not to be an industry on the ground that the cooperation between employer and employee lacked a direct nexus with the professional services rendered. University of Delhi v. Ram Nath excluded universities, characterising education as more of a “mission” than a trade or business. Madras Gymkhana Club and Cricket Club of India similarly excluded members’ clubs.

The high-water mark of the restrictive approach was Safdarjung Hospital v. Kuldip Singh Sethi, a Six-Judge Bench decision that expressly overruled Hospital Mazdoor Sabha. The Court held that an activity must bear a close analogy to trade or business in a commercial sense and be directed towards production of material goods or provision of material services possessing commercial value. Hospitals run as governmental departments or purely charitable institutions were excluded.

4. The Bangalore Water Supply Decision
In 1978, a Seven-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa was called upon to resolve the deep and persistent conflict that had come to characterise the interpretation of the term “industry” under Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The reference itself was occasioned by the continuing uncertainty that had survived and in the words of Krishna Iyer, J., had been “accentuated” by the earlier Six-Judge Bench decision in Safdarjung Hospital. The Court was conscious that the question had become a “diehard dispute” requiring authoritative and final resolution.

The leading judgment was delivered by Krishna Iyer, J., speaking for himself, P.N. Bhagwati, J. and D.A. Desai, J. Concurring opinions were rendered by M.H. Beg, C.J. and by Y.V. Chandrachud, J. (as he then was). Jaswant Singh, J., speaking for himself and V.D. Tulzapurkar, J., delivered a partly dissenting opinion. The effective majority of the Court thus stood at 5:2. The majority, while accepting the broad contours of the earlier expansive approach, sought to place the definition on a more coherent and principled foundation. In doing so, it propounded what has since come to be universally recognised as the ‘Triple Test’.

4. 1 The Triple Test
The Triple Test, as formulated in the leading judgment, postulates the existence of three essential elements,

1. a systematic and organised activity
2. cooperation between employer and employee in the conduct of such activity and
3. the production or distribution of goods and services calculated to satisfy human wants and wishes (excluding activities of a purely spiritual or religious character).

The Court made it clear that the presence of a profit motive or any gainful objective was entirely immaterial. An enterprise could fall within the definition of “industry” irrespective of whether it was carried on in the public, joint, private, or any other sector. The decisive inquiry, the Court emphasised, was functional rather than formal. What mattered was the nature of the activity and the existence of an organised employer-employee relationship that bore a discernible resemblance to the relationship found in trade or business.

In elaborating the second limb of the test cooperation between employer and employee the Court rejected any requirement of a rigid or proximate nexus. It held that the relationship need not be one of direct partnership in the production of the final output; it was sufficient that the activity was organised on the basis of cooperation between those who employed and those who were employed. Similarly, the phrase “goods and services calculated to satisfy human wants and wishes” was given a wide but not unlimited meaning. Purely spiritual or religious activities were excluded, but material goods and services even when associated with a religious or charitable objective were brought within the fold.

The majority further clarified that the expression “undertaking” in Section 2(j) must suffer a contextual and associational shrinkage. While the provision was to be given a broad and purposive construction, it was not to be so expanded as to become all-encompassing. Organised activities that satisfied the Triple Test, even if not strictly amounting to trade or business, could still qualify as “industry” provided the essential character of the employer-employee relationship resembled that found in commercial undertakings.

On this basis, the Court held that professions, clubs, educational institutions, cooperatives, research bodies, charitable projects, and other analogous ventures could not be excluded from the definition of “industry” merely by reason of their form, avowed purpose, or absence of profit motive, so long as they satisfied the requirements of the Triple Test. Only a limited category of genuinely eleemosynary institutions where the activity was carried on predominantly by individuals rendering services gratuitously or for nominal honoraria out of a sense of service or spiritual commitment stood outside the statutory fold.

The Triple Test thus represented both a culmination and a recalibration of the earlier jurisprudence. It sought to preserve the beneficial and expansive orientation of the statute while imposing a measure of conceptual discipline through the requirement of systematic organisation, employer-employee cooperation, and a functional resemblance to trade or business.
5. Post-Bangalore Water Supply Developments
The decision in Bangalore Water Supply was widely regarded as having brought a measure of doctrinal stability to a long-troubled area of the law. That stability, however, proved short-lived. Within a few years of the judgment, both the legislature and the judiciary found themselves grappling with the practical and conceptual consequences of the expansive Triple Test. The subsequent developments unfolded along two parallel tracks, one legislative and the other judicial and it was the unresolved tension between these tracks that ultimately necessitated the constitution of a Nine-Judge Bench.
Parliament responded to the width of the Triple Test by enacting the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1982.  The Amendment sought to retain the core functional approach of Bangalore Water Supply while introducing a series of carefully calibrated exclusions. The amended definition of “industry” continued to cover systematic activities organised through employer-employee cooperation for the production or distribution of goods and services. At the same time, it expressly carved out the following categories:

• agricultural operations (except where integrated with industrial activity)
• hospitals and dispensaries
• educational, scientific, research or training institutions
• institutions engaged in charitable, social or philanthropic service
• khadi or village industries
• activities of the Government relatable to its sovereign functions, including the departments dealing with defence research, atomic energy and space
• domestic service
• professions practised by an individual or body of individuals employing fewer than ten persons
•  and cooperative societies, clubs or like bodies employing fewer than ten persons.

The legislative intent was clear that is to preserve the beneficial reach of the statute while preventing its indiscriminate application to activities that Parliament considered inappropriate for industrial adjudication. Yet, in a development of lasting significance, the amended definition was never brought into force. Although the Amendment Act received presidential assent and was published in the Official Gazette, the Central Government never issued the notification required to give effect to the new definition of “industry.” As a result, for more than four decades the Triple Test of Bangalore Water Supply continued to operate as the governing law, while the carefully negotiated legislative exclusions remained stillborn.

This legislative inertia created a peculiar legal situation. Courts were bound by the expansive judicial formulation, even as the statute books contained an unnotified provision that sought to restrict it. The continued non-notification of the 1982 Amendment became a recurring point of criticism and was later relied upon by parties seeking reconsideration of Bangalore Water Supply.

Even as the legislative response remained incomplete, judicial discord re-emerged, particularly in relation to the scope of the sovereign functions exception and the status of governmental welfare schemes. Two decisions concerning the Social Forestry Departments of different States brought the conflict into sharp relief.

In Chief Conservator of Forests v. Jagannath Maruti Kondhare, a Three-Judge Bench held that the Social Forestry Department of the State of Maharashtra fell within the definition of “industry.” Applying the Triple Test, the Court reasoned that the activity was systematic and organised, involved cooperation between the State as employer and its workmen, and produced material services (environmental amelioration and the supply of forest produce) for the community. The fact that the scheme was welfare-oriented and undertaken by a governmental department was held insufficient to attract the sovereign functions exception, which the Court confined to the narrow category of inalienable sovereign functions.

A contrary view was taken by a Two-Judge Bench in State of Gujarat v. Pratamsingh Narsinh Parmar.  There the Court held that the Social Forestry Department of the State of Gujarat did not constitute an “industry.” Emphasising the welfare character of the activity and the absence of a commercial or economic orientation, the Bench concluded that such governmental schemes fell outside the statutory definition. The decision effectively expanded the sovereign functions exception beyond the narrow limits set in Bangalore Water Supply and Jagannath Kondhare.

These two decisions stood in direct conflict on a question of considerable public importance of whether welfare-oriented environmental schemes undertaken by State Forest Departments attracted the protective regime of the Industrial Disputes Act. The conflict was not confined to Social Forestry. Similar uncertainties arose in relation to research institutions, certain categories of hospitals, and other governmental activities that blurred the line between sovereign functions and industrial undertakings.

The cumulative effect of the unnotified 1982 Amendment, the conflicting decisions on Social Forestry, and the broader concerns about the over-inclusiveness of the Triple Test led a Five-Judge Bench in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Jai Bir Singh to take the extraordinary step of referring the correctness of Bangalore Water Supply for reconsideration by a larger Bench. The Five-Judge Bench observed that the expansive interpretation had generated practical difficulties, that the decision itself had not been unanimous in its reasoning, and that the continued non-notification of the 1982 Amendment indicated a legislative desire to restrict the definition. It therefore framed questions concerning the correctness of the Triple Test, the scope of the sovereign functions exception, and the status of governmental welfare activities.

The reference was initially placed before a Seven-Judge Bench. However, having regard to the significance of the questions involved, the complexity of the jurisprudential history, and the need for an authoritative and final determination that would settle the law for both the residual matters under the ID Act and the emerging regime under the Industrial Relations Code, the matter was ultimately referred to a Bench of Nine Judges. The constitution of a Nine-Judge Bench reflected the institutional recognition that the definition of “industry” had become a question of fundamental importance, touching upon the allocation of adjudicatory jurisdiction, the rights of large numbers of workmen employed in governmental and welfare establishments, and the proper relationship between judicial interpretation and legislative policy. It was against these incomplete legislative response, persistent judicial conflict, and a formal reference questioning the continued correctness of a seven-Judge precedent that the Nine-Judge Constitution Bench assembled to deliver its judgment on 20 August 2026.

6. The Nine-Judge Bench Judgment of 20 August 2026

On 20 August 2026, a Nine-Judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court delivered its long-awaited judgment in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Jai Bir Singh and the connected batch of matters. The Bench comprised of Hon’ble Mr. Justice Surya Kant, Chief Justice of India, Hon’ble Mrs. Justice B.V. Nagarathna, Hon’ble Mr. Justice P.S. Narasimha, Hon’ble Mr. Justice Dipankar Datta, Hon’ble Mr. Justice Ujjal Bhuyan, Hon’ble Mr. Justice Satish Chandra Sharma, Hon’ble Mr. Justice Joymalya Bagchi, Hon’ble Mr. Justice Alok Aradhe and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Vipul M. Pancholi

The Constitution Bench was called upon to examine a range of fundamental questions that had remained unresolved for over two decades. These included the maintainability of the reference made by the Five-Judge Bench in Jai Bir Singh (2005), the continued correctness of the Triple Test propounded in Bangalore Water Supply, the precise scope of the sovereign functions exception, the status of governmental welfare schemes such as Social Forestry Departments, the legal effect (if any) of the unnotified Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1982, and the relationship between the jurisprudence developed under Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the newly enacted definition of “industry” under Section 2(p) of the Industrial Relations Code, 2020.

The judgment is polyvocal. The principal opinion was authored by Chief Justice Surya Kant, speaking for himself and Justices Satish Chandra Sharma, Alok Aradhe and Vipul M. Pancholi. Separate opinions were delivered by Justice B.V. Nagarathna, Justice P.S. Narasimha, Justice Dipankar Datta (for himself and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan), and Justice Joymalya Bagchi. While the Bench was not unanimous on every aspect of the reformulation of the Triple Test, there was broad consensus on the maintainability of the reference, the continued applicability of the original Bangalore Water Supply principles to pending matters under the repealed ID Act, and the necessity of interpreting the IR Code independently of the 1978 precedent.

The judgment represents the most comprehensive judicial examination of the concept of “industry” since 1978. It carefully navigates the tension between doctrinal continuity and the need for refinement, between the settled expectations of litigants under the old regime and the legislative design of the new labour codes, and between the institutional duty to answer a validly made reference and the practical reality that Section 2(j) of the ID Act has ceased to be the operative law.

6.1 Maintainability of the Reference
The Court held that the reference had been validly made and was maintainable. It was neither barred by the principles of res judicata nor by stare decisis in a manner that precluded reconsideration. The Court emphasised its constitutional duty to adjudicate a question validly referred, notwithstanding the intervening repeal of the ID Act and the coming into force of the IR Code.

6.2 Majority Opinion
The majority opinion, authored by Surya Kant, CJI (on behalf of himself, Satish Chandra Sharma, J., Alok Aradhe, J. and Vipul M. Pancholi, J.),[1] held that while the essential framework of the Triple Test had stood the test of time, certain aspects were susceptible to further refinement. In a carefully articulated “hypothetical” reformulation, the Court restated the test as follows:

 Industry under Section 2(j) will be defined as,
Where there exists: (i) a systematic activity; (ii) organised through cooperation between employer and employee; and (iii) the production, distribution, or provision of goods or services possessing a discernible commercial character that is analogous to trade or business and calculated to satisfy material human wants and wishes (as distinguished from activities that are purely spiritual or religious in nature, though not excluding the provision of material goods or services merely because they are associated with a religious objective), a prima facie presumption shall arise that the undertaking constitutes an ‘industry’ within the meaning of Section 2(j).

1. Absence of profit motive or gainful objective is irrelevant, be the venture in the public, joint, private, or any other sector.
2. The true focus is functional and the decisive test is the nature of the activity and the existence of employer-employee relations.
3. If the organisation is a trade or business, it does not cease to be one merely because philanthropy animates the undertaking in its official documentation but on enquiry it is found otherwise.

The majority retained the Dominant Nature Test and the narrow sovereign functions exception, while emphasising that the reformulated Triple Test was offered as the Court’s considered opinion on the proper interpretation of Section 2(j) of the ID Act. Crucially, the Court directed that all matters presently pending under the ID Act may continue to be adjudicated in accordance with the original Triple Test laid down in Bangalore Water Supply. The clarification was to operate prospectively and not to reopen finalised proceedings.

6.3 Minority and Concurrent Views
Justices B.V. Nagarathna, Dipankar Datta and Joymalya Bagchi, in separate opinions,[2] strongly affirmed the continued correctness and binding force of the original Triple Test for the purposes of the repealed ID Act. They emphasised the principles of stare decisis, the beneficial object of the legislation, the settled expectations of parties over nearly five decades, and the limited scope of the sovereign functions exception. They cautioned against using the stillborn 1982 Amendment or the prospective IR Code as tools to rewrite a long-settled precedent governing legacy matters.

6.4 Treatment of the IR Code
The Bench was unanimous that the 1978 decision shall not be regarded as the “sheet anchor” for the interpretation of the IR Code or any of its provisions.[3] The definition of “industry” under the new Code must be interpreted independently on the basis of its own text, scheme, object, and legislative framework, uninfluenced by the reformulation undertaken in the judgment.
7. The Definition of “Industry” under the Industrial Relations Code, 2020 as on Date

For all matters arising on or after 21 November 2025, the governing definition is contained in Section 2(p) of the IR Code:[4]

“industry” means any systematic activity carried on by co-operation between an employer and worker (whether such worker is employed by such employer directly or by or through any agency, including a contractor) for the production, supply or distribution of goods or services with a view to satisfy human wants or wishes (not being wants or wishes which are merely spiritual or religious in nature), whether or not

1. any capital has been invested for the purpose of carrying on such activity; or
2. such activity is carried on with a motive to make any gain or profit, but does not include,
3. institutions owned or managed by organisations wholly or substantially engaged in any charitable, social or philanthropic service; or
4. any activity of the appropriate Government relatable to the sovereign functions of the appropriate Government including all the activities carried on by the departments of the Central Government dealing with defence research, atomic energy and space; or
5. any domestic service; or
6. any other activity as may be notified by the Central Government.”

This definition substantially retains the functional core of the Triple Test, systematic activity, employer-worker cooperation (expressly including contract labour), and satisfaction of material human wants while introducing clear statutory exclusions that the 1982 Amendment had sought but never operationalised. Profit motive and capital investment remain irrelevant. The exclusion of charitable, social or philanthropic institutions, core sovereign functions, domestic service, and any activity notified by the Central Government marks a deliberate legislative narrowing of the earlier judicially expanded field.

8. Practical Implications for Specific Categories

The dual regime created by the 2026 Judgment retaining the original Triple Test for legacy disputes under the Industrial Disputes Act while mandating an independent interpretation of Section 2(p) of the Industrial Relations Code carries significant practical consequences for several categories of establishments that have historically occupied the grey zone of industrial jurisprudence. The impact is particularly pronounced in governmental welfare schemes, hospitals, educational and research institutions, charitable organisations, and smaller collective entities such as clubs and cooperatives.

8.1 Governmental Welfare Schemes and Social Forestry

Under the original Triple Test, the Social Forestry Department was held to be an industry in Jagannath Kondhare. Under the IR Code, the position is more nuanced. If the activity is characterised as relatable to the sovereign functions of the appropriate Government, or if it is carried on by an organisation wholly or substantially engaged in charitable, social or philanthropic service, it may stand excluded. The independent interpretation mandated by the 2026 Judgment requires a careful examination of the nature, organisation, and predominant character of the activity in each case.

8.2 Hospitals, Educational Institutions and Research Bodies

The IR Code does not contain an express exclusion for hospitals or educational institutions per se. However, institutions owned or managed by organisations wholly or substantially engaged in charitable, social or philanthropic service are excluded. Purely governmental hospitals discharging sovereign welfare functions may also claim the sovereign functions exclusion. Research institutions will fall within or outside the definition depending on whether they satisfy the positive criteria of systematic activity and cooperation for production/supply/distribution of goods or services, and whether any exclusion applies.
8.3 Charitable and Philanthropic Organisations
The express exclusion in Section 2(p)(i) of the IR Code provides significant clarity. Organisations wholly or substantially engaged in charitable, social or philanthropic service are outside the definition. This represents a marked departure from the position under Bangalore Water Supply, where many such organisations were brought within the fold if they satisfied the Triple Test.
Clubs, Cooperatives and Small Establishments
Under the IR Code, the determination will turn on whether the activity is systematic, involves employer-worker cooperation, and is directed at satisfying material human wants, subject to any applicable exclusion. Small clubs or associations may still fall outside if they lack the requisite organisational character or if a notification is issued under Section 2(p)(iv).Conclusion

The 2026 Judgment carefully balances finality with clarity. All pending proceedings under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 continue to be governed by the original Triple Test of Bangalore Water Supply. Finalised awards, settlements, and determinations remain undisturbed. The reformulated Triple Test and the observations regarding independent interpretation of the Industrial Relations Code, 2020 operate prospectively. Rights and liabilities accrued under the repealed ID Act are preserved by the general savings clause in Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, read with the transitional provisions of the IR Code.

In doing so, the Judgment represents a mature judicial response to a long-standing controversy. By declining to overrule Bangalore Water Supply for pending matters while simultaneously freeing the IR Code from its shadow, the Court has achieved a delicate equilibrium between continuity and change. The legislative choice in the IR Code to retain the functional core while introducing clear exclusions reflects a policy preference for a more calibrated protective regime one that continues to cover systematic organised activity analogous to trade or business, yet deliberately excludes core charitable, philanthropic, and sovereign spheres. Thus, a s on date the definition of “industry” is dual-layered that is to say,

1. For legacy disputes under the ID Act: the original Triple Test of Bangalore Water Supply continues to apply.
2. For all new matters under the IR Code: Section 2(p) governs, to be interpreted independently on its own text and scheme, without the expansive gloss of the 1978 decision.

Industrial jurisprudence can now move forward with greater coherence, certainty, and fidelity to the legislative design of the contemporary labour codes. Courts, tribunals, employers, and workmen must navigate this dual regime with careful attention to the date of the dispute and the applicable statutory framework. The 2026 Judgment stands as both a scholarly exposition of the historical journey and a definitive guide for the road ahead.

References

1. Ahmedabad Textile Industry’s Research Association v. State of Bombay, AIR 1961 SC 484 : (1961) 2 SCR 480.
2. Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa, (1978) 2 SCC 213.
3. Chief Conservator of Forests v. Jagannath Maruti Kondhare, (1996) 2 SCC 293.
4. Corporation of the City of Nagpur v. Its Employees, AIR 1960 SC 675 : (1960) 2 SCR 942.
5. D.N. Banerji v. P.R. Mukherjee, AIR 1953 SC 58.
6. Madras Gymkhana Club Employees’ Union v. Madras Gymkhana Club, AIR 1968 SC 554.
7. National Union of Commercial Employees v. M.R. Meher, AIR 1962 SC 1080.
8. Safdarjung Hospital v. Kuldip Singh Sethi, (1970) 1 SCC 735.
9. State of Bombay v. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha, AIR 1960 SC 610.
10. State of Gujarat v. Pratamsingh` Narsinh Parmar, (2001) 9 SCC 713.
11. University of Delhi v. Ram Nath, AIR 1963 SC 1873.
12. State of Uttar Pradesh v. Jai Bir Singh, (2005) 5 SCC 1 (Five-Judge Bench reference order dated 5 May 2005).
13. State of Uttar Pradesh v. Jai Bir Singh, (2017) 3 SCC 311 (Seven-Judge Bench order dated 2 January 2017 referring the matter to a Nine-Judge Bench).
14. State of Uttar Pradesh v. Jai Bir Singh, 2026 INSC 897 (Nine-Judge Constitution Bench judgment dated 20 August 2026)
15. The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (particularly Section 2(j) as it stood prior to repeal).
16. The Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1982.
17. The Industrial Relations Code, 2020 (particularly Section 2(p)).
18. The General Clauses Act, 1897 (Section 6).

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[1]See the majority opinion authored by Surya Kant, CJI (for himself, Satish Chandra Sharma, J., Alok Aradhe, J. and Vipul M. Pancholi, J.) in the 2026 Judgment, particularly paragraphs 247, 285–290 and the reformulated Triple Test set out therein.

[2]Separate opinions of B.V. Nagarathna, J., Dipankar Datta, J. and Joymalya Bagchi, J. largely affirming the continued correctness of the original Triple Test for purposes of the repealed ID Act.

[3]The 2026 Judgment, Conclusion, points (iii)–(vi).

[4]Section 2(p) of the Industrial Relations Code, 2020.